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The Politics Of Consensus: Quadhafi's Libyan Quest 
B ERNARD ScHECHTERMAN 
University of Miami 
After a period of more than ten years of rule by the Revolutionary 
command Council (RCC), Libyan developments lend themselves to evalua-
tion in sever al respects-economic modernization and development, inter-
national oil policy (OPEC and OAPEC), intra-Arab bloc politics, pan-
movement activities (Arabism and Islamism), third world relationships (in-
cluding liberation movements' support), and internal political development. 
The least understood and analyzed aspect has been Libyan internal political 
development, its political philosophical underpinnings and the actual 
growth pattern of political institutions. This essay focusses on the latter 
aspect of Libyan society because of the dearth of available knowledge and 
perception, as well as its much broader implications for political evolution 
in the Arab/Islamic world. StructuraJly, the presentation unfolds in three 
steps: 1) the cultural/intellectual influences and other factors determining 
political developments; 2) the philosophical concepts and internal political 
institutional developments; and 3) an evaluation of the decade of political 
development, including its implications and ramifications. 
The Cultural/ Intellectual Influences 
An understanding of these influences must begin with the pre-
revolutionary period. The monarch, King Idris, reflected the continued in-
fluence of the Sanussi Brotherhood, a puritanical and mystical movement 
with over 100 years of historical roots in Libya, particularly Cyrenaica 
(Eastern province). The founder of the movement, Mohammad Ibn Ali as-
Sanussi was Algerian by birth (1790) and traced his descent from the 
Prophet himself through his daughter Fatima. His pilgrimmage to Mecca 
and several religious ventures in the Arabian peninsula, also at al-Azhar 
University in Cario, were preliminary stages prior to his settlement in 
Cyrenaica . The first "lodge" of the Brotherhood was set up shortly 
thereafter and was the beginning of a significantly new religious order 
within Islam. At its peak, it is estimated that two million "brothers" were 
enrolled in the Sanussi Order. Despite their growing success, other reformist 
(purist) movements rejected working with them, i.e., Arabia, Sudan, 
Egypt. ' 
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Aside from the influential dissemination of a revived Islam in 
Cyrenaica and other areas of the Islamic world, the founder and his son, al. 
Mahdi, developed a facility for working with the bedouin and tribal gro ups 
in the region, transcending their primitive social order and rigid divisio ns. 
The Order would not have been successful had it failed to preserve and 
benefit these traditional people. Fortunately, about 70 years passed befo re 
the people and geography were ubjected to any alternative challenge (in-
fluence), European imperialism led by the Italian invasion of Tripoli in 
19 I I. 2 Analogous to the Wahhabiyah in the Arabian peninsula, a historic al 
and physcial distance from the mainstream of western ideas and power, per-
mitted pristine piety to become imbedded as the basic value syste m, 
especially a stress on return to classical I lamic Law. 1 The Sanussi Order has 
been viewed as the reform movement clo est to orthodox Islam. Ultimate ly 
accepted throughout Libya, it was mo t influential among the Cyrenaica ns 
led by the King.• 
With a strong Islamic revivali t organization and heritage, it is not sur-
prising that the indigenous population began a concerted effort at resi ta nce 
to foreign rule, cooperating with the Turks against the Italians, as a way of 
confronting the contradictory influences. Virtually from the beginning of 
the Italian entre, a guerrilla war ensued, the primitive tribesmen aided in-
itially by Turkish officers and during World War One additionally by the 
Germans and the Austrians. Although apparently victorious, the Italia n 
after the war decided to end all opposition in Libya. The brutal and de truc -
tive colonial war, 1921-1932, was made even more vicious by the ri e and 
triumph of facism in Italy, with its gross contempt and inhumanity for the 
local populace. The ramifications of the suffering tribesmen not only re-
enforced their overall sentiment against foreign rule, but produced an inte r-
pretation of the West as evil and personifying a clash along contradicto ry 
civilization lines. 5 
Anti-foreign rule was further hardened by the calculated efforts at 
Italian colonization and displacement in the remainder of the inter-w ar 
period. When World War Two erupted, the Sanussi leadership chose to sup-
port the Allied side against the Italians. Despite the defeat of the Italian , 
post-war efforts for the resolution of the future of Libya foundered in the 
political differences among the victoriou Great Powers. Libya underwen t a 
disjointed and disoriented six years of haggling even though the popu lace 
expressed a distinct desire for independence. In a fit of frustration and with 
a sense of futility, Libya was finally granted independence by the Politic al 
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in 1951 (to take eff ect 
in 1952). King Idris as-Sanussi was proclaimed ruler of a United King dom 
of Libya, reflecting the merger of Islamic and anti-foreign rule sentiments . 6 
Given thirty years of war, repression and deprivation, it is not sur pris-
ing that little economic or political infrastructure existed to permit a func-
tioning new state. 1 The King and his royal household, with great affinity in 
the Cyrenaica region, represented an imposition of authority on the we tern 
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and southern provinces of Tripolitania and Fezzan. These regional and 
tribal animosities had been strongly encouraged by the Italians during their 
rule. Thus, while anti-foreign rule served as a continuous basis of unified 
opposition to the Italians, upon attainment of independence, the internal 
divisions of a traditionally poor and backward society came to the 
forefront. 8 Given the circumstances of a new and vacuous society, the only 
available basic influence was traditional Islam, and this force had not served 
to generate the modern concept of a nation. 
Islamic fundamentalism and Arab nationalism merged in the 1950's 
and I960's in the form of a group of young Libyan army officers (junta) 
subsequently led in their 1969 coup by a 27-year-old Captain, Muammar al-
Quadhafi. Confronted by the intrusion of new foreign elements, largely 
represented by the United States direct and indirect role in the country, the 
conspirators turned their objections against the regime of King Idris. 1959 
saw the modest beginnings of western oil discoveries and the increased 
intrusions of the private petroleum companies. The United States Govern-
ment's direct presence was discernible via the NATO air force training com-
mand operations at Wheelus Field outside Tripoli. The training of and im-
pact America had on Libyan personnel both at Wheelus and in the United 
States, only fanned their envy and discontent against the more primitive and 
backward way of life under the monarchy. Eventually this intensified and 
accelerated the coup attempt. 9 
In the first surge of independence euphoria, the people rallied around 
the monarchy. From 1963 to 1969, instability became a constant condition. 
The breakdown reflected the internal tensions between the three major 
regions and their populations' different orientations (tribal and parochial), 
governmental crises at the top levels reflecting these discrepancies and 
failures at true consolidation, and finally, the new perspectives and percep-
tions of elite elements reacting against the intrusions of foreign ideas and in-
fluences. The combination of these factors, plus the neighboring influence 
of Nasserism, produced the impetus for revolutionary action and the 
recognition that an alternative organizational system was possible. 10 The 
political sociology and social psychology of revolutionary dynamics, 
especially in terms of the military's role, has been effectively summarized 
elsewhere, 11 and needs no repeating in the Libyan case. 12 
The second major intellectual influence on Libyan political develop-
ment was Nasserism, the force of the man's ideas and his revolutionary 
acts. The study of the Libyan evolution before and since its own coup is a 
major testimonial to the profound impact that the first great Arab/Islamic 
post-World War Two coup (1952) had upon the whole region. Quadhafi, as 
a youngster and as a junior officer, lived through the explosive and roman-
tic period of Nasserism unleashed in the Middle East and around the world. 
Conveniently from a background of a bedouin family removed from the 
leading and competing tribes or families, geographically Sirte located be-
tween Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, he was uncommitted to the divisional 
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patterns of Libyan society. 12a Nasserism was attractive to him as the new 
energizing and revival force of Arabism and Islam, especially under 
Nasser's leadership. u 
Given this nearly total commitment to Nasserism, the analogy (with 
Egypt's Farouk) of opposition to a corrupt monarchy was easily arrive d at, 
and a recognition of the pervasiveness of Nasser's pan-Arab ideas upo n ur. 
ban Libyan elites was readily perceived by the young military officers. The 
activism of Nasser in rallying the Arab world to pan-Arabism by stress ing 
the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1964 on strongly impacted Quadhafi. The 
popular and direct appeals to Libya by the heroic figure of Nasser, especially 
for expulsion of foreign elements, reenforced Quadhafi's orientatio n and 
further undercut the monarchy because of its continuing relations with the 
West." 
Nasserism dictated an "eastern orientation" for Libya (as it did for the 
Algerian revolution). ,s The guiding principles of the revolution as first 
enunciated reflected Nasserist influence-anit-foreign oppression, a mar. 
riage of socialism and Islam, and a pan-Arab unity of their world (including 
Palestine). 16 The Nasserist (Egyptian) model was in evidence immed iately 
after the coup as evidenced by a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) 
and a formal government comprised of both civilians and some military 
personnel. The General Neguib (Egyptian) pattern of a "revoluti onary 
front man" of higher rank and traditional connections was apparent in the 
persons of the Defense Minister (Adan al-Hawwaz) and the Int erior 
Minister (Musa Ahmak). As prominent Cyrenaicans, they served to 
legitimatize the coup, and as in the Egyptian model, both were dismi ssed 
soon afterwards (December, 1969) to clarify the true power base of the 
revolutionary leadership. The preeminence of an outrightly military regime 
after the initial fallouts and consolidation efforts followed the Egyptian 
pattern almost literally." 
All the initial policies implemented by the RCC and the government 
reflected the twin influences of Islamic fundamentalism and Nasse rism. 
Domestically, Quadhafi imposed a "puritanical" Islam. Alcohol was pro-
hibited (even at foreign embassies for a time), liquor-serving establish ments 
(including night clubs) were closed down, the Arabic language too k over 
completely in the every day lifestyle, and all evidences of the colonia l pa t 
were set upon to be eradicated. ' 8 
In Quadhafi's external policies, Nasserism became the para mount 
guiding principles. Foreign bases run by Britain and the United States were 
closed down and their personnel forced to leave. The anti-foreigne r na-
tionalism also invoked some positive forms expressed by Nasser's influe nce: 
I) subsidization of the Palestinian guerrilla organization most pop ular at 
the time, al-Fatah, and 2) pan-Arabic nationalistic unity vis-a-vis the 
Maghreb states (Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco), and 3) support for Egypt 
as the true center for the total unification of all Arab states. When the 
Maghreb scheme failed, it was Nasser who proved his and Egypt's wort h by 
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igning the Tripoli Charter, the tripartite agreement including Sudan as well. 
~onceivably the Quadhafi acquiescence in Egypt's leading role would have 
ersisted had not Nasser died in 1970. Legitimate speculation then ensued 
fhat Quadhafi felt he had inherited Nasser's leadership mantle. 19 It is also 
possible to speculate that Quadhafi may have been willing to accept the con-
tinuing central role of Egypt, but that Sadat, as well as other Arab-world 
leaders simply rejected or relegated his euphoric pan-Arabism/Islarnism to 
a more limited and realistic level of importance. Certainly the number of 
confrontations that subsequently took place between Quadhafi and leaders 
from Morocco to Syria 20 could well sustain his belief there was only one 
logical successor to Nasser given these circumstances. The difference could 
be a matter of a self-ordained adulation versus a reactive no alternative 
motivation. 
The full extent of Nasser's influence will become even more apparent 
when detailing the conceptual views specifically implemented in institu-
tional forms in the post-revolutionary dynamics. 
The Resource (Oil) Factor as an Influence 
What may have appeared to be an unrelated factor actually became a 
crucial influence on the evolution of the Libyan political system. Oil became 
a dynamic variable at its point of introduction into Libyan society in 1959. 21 
Once the spigot was turned on, Libya became one of the world's leading oil-
producers. In 1969 Libya's exports rivalled Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The 
RCC and Quadhafi's popularity were easily sustainable because of this 
"vast and increasing wealth. " 22 It certainly turned out to be easier for 
Quadhafi to lead a previously impoverished society, small in population, 
regularly exposed to an increasing capability and distribution of new and 
more wealth, 23 * to accept his experimentation with variations in political 
systems and institutions. This type of scenario, plentifulness of resources 
versus small population pressure upon them, has been rare in history. 
However, in the post-World War Two period the world public has been ex-
posed to a number of these unique historical examples, especially in the 
Middle East region (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, 
Bahrain, etc.). 
• Oil revenues jumped from 1.6 billion dollars in 1972 to 8.6 billion dollars in 1978. 
External Left Radicalism as an Influence 
With the failures of Egyptian and/ or Maghreb unification efforts, and 
subsequent formal and informal opposition from these same sources, a 
strong case can be made for Quadhafi's (Libya's) assertiveness as the leader 
of the Arab / Islamic bloc and as a leader of Third World "causes" in his 
own right. Given the tremendous accumulation of oil monies, access and 
purchase of military hardware and other technologies, including nuclear, 
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became feasible objectives . 23 a Thus the Nasserist and radical Islam visions 
were not dependent upon the central role of Quadhafi's policies. A turn to 
the USSR for armaments reflected the latter's support of Quadhafi's radic al 
behavior rather than the reverse, a commitment by Libya's leader to Mar x-
ism. But the Soviet Union had become an important factor in supporti ng 
and consolidating the assumed validity of belief and action of the highly 
ideological Quadhafi. Quadhafi even deduced from Soviet external polic ies 
the opportunity of becoming an Afro-Arab Castro that would have gra ve 
implications for two continents and internal aspects of Libyan behavi or 
(training and exporting terrorists in support of Nasserist/lslamic fun-
damentalist goals). 23 b 
The other radical influence that came from abroad seems pretty self. 
evident, the Chinese internal mobilization model connected with Ma o's 
"cultural revolution" of the late 1960's and early 1970's. The timing was 
appropriate. So much of the popular mobilization efforts in Libya reflect 
similarities with the Chinese activities as will be evident in this essay's 
description and analysis of the current stage of Libya's political insti tu-
tionalization, The Direct Authority of the People. It is surely no accid ent 
that Quadhafi appeared on the scene with The Green Books, analogous to 
Mao's Red Book, and the terminology of "popular (cultural) revolutio n." 
The simplistic nature of the respective books-'Sayings, wisdo ms, 
homilies-evidences a definite correlation of circumstances and choices. 
The Evolution of Quadhafi's Libyan Political System 
Institutionally, the Libyan revolution over an abbreviated period of 
four post-years ran the course of three stages. The September to Decem ber, 
1969 period was the "consolidation stage" and ended with the eliminat ion 
of a countercoup. Another way of characterizing this stage is the "po wer 
clarification stage." The second stage saw the RCC assert itself by taki ng 
over the actual government for the period of January, 1970 to July, 1971. 
Quadhafi's leadership was mo t evident and pronounced as he as urned the 
Prime Mini tership and Defense Ministry. The third brief stage, from 
August, 1971 to April, 1973 reflected a withdrawal tendency by the milit ary 
junta members from formal governmental positions. For Quadhafi himse lf, 
the process was confirmed a year later (April, 1974) when the RCC decreed 
that he was thereafter to devote himself to the twin tasks of ideology and 
institution-building among the Libyan masses. 2• Paralleling Nas er's 
behavior, he was to formulate and ystematize a political and social 
philosophy and implement it by concrete institutional efforts. 
De pite some contrary evidences of friction and dissent in the po I· 
revolutionary period, the centrality of Quadhafi's preeminence as leader 
was and is accepted both within and external to Libyan society. Follow ing 
his reassignment in April, 1974 to "organizational and ideological action," 26 
there has been no dispute that Libyan political evolution can best be 
described and explained in terms of Quadhafi. However, it would be 
misleading to assume Quadhafi's ystematic conceptualization first began 
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with this date and circumstance. 
As a revolutionary, Quadhafi was aware of the need to establish an 
ideological basis not only for legitimizing new rule but also to serve as an in-
tegrative / unification device and as a guide for the future development of 
the society. At the earliest moment and in superficial fashion, Quadhafi 
coopted Nasserism as his ideology, especially that part of the model that 
called for widespread (mass) public participation via a comparable political 
organization. This became evident with the Libyan adoption of the Egyptian 
Arab Socialist Union in June, 1971 as the participation / organizational 
model for their own society. This act was really the second act by the revolu-
tionary leadership in the centralization of their power while conveying the 
impression of public participation. In September, 1970, the Popular 
Resistance Movement was created to strengthen the regime against internal 
threats and win popular support for such efforts . 21 But the key centerpiece 
to reflect Quadhafi's political philo sophy and institutional effort s remained 
the Arab Sociali st Union . Founded in I 971, it held its opening Congress in 
March, 1972, and could be labelled finished by April, I 973. 28 
The Arab Socialist Union (ASU) 
Whereas Nasser introduced the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) ten years 
1 after his officer coup, Quadhafi moved to coopt and impose the organiza-
tion on Libya three years after attaining power (1971) and nine years after 
Nasser's experience. The outward table of organization was virtually iden -
tical from one society to another. 29 Ideologically the objectives seemed to be 
the same-Arab socialism, Arab unity and positive non-alignment in exter-
nal relations. 30 The broad expectations were to attain democracy by the peo-
ple, a socialist revolution of the working people, and to protect the public 
guarantees provided by the National Charter. The guarantees were to be 
sustained by assuring at least 50% representation in the ASU by workers 
and farmers, labelled the overwhelming majority of the population. 3 1 The 
ASU was recognized as the socialist vanguard that would both lead the peo-
ple, express their will, and direct national action and progress in terms of 
the people's demands and needs. 32 Representation was structured in 
pyramidal fashion based on both geographic distribution of the populace 
and economic and social sector interest groups in the society. The most 
basic units were set up at city, village or village-equivalent levels (factories, 
schools, businesses, etc.). Next came 25 district (governates) level units, 
supplementing and complementing the basic units. At the top of the na -
tional pyramid was the National Congress of the ASU and the Central 
Committee, which designated the Higher Executive Committee, the apex of 
the system. 3 3 Significantly, membership was open to all citizenry save for 
"feudalists" and "exploitative capitalists," both ideological categories. 
Libya under Quadhafi made some modifications in the cooption 
because of some fundamental differences in the respective societies and due 
57 
to Quadhafi's political philosophy. Becau e of hi commitment to I lamic 
fundamentalism (certainly more consistent with a traditional and trib al 
society found in Libya), Quadhafi couched ASU objective in terms of 
Islam a a universal religion and simultaneously as a political ideology. Cer. 
tainly Nasserism inferred this too, but Quadhafi went much further. He 
stressed the antithesis between Islam and communism. In a novel twi t, 
Quadhafi insi ted that Islam was the basis for both Arab socialism and 
politics. He sought to persuade Libyan masses that Islam was revolutiona ry 
because it was the first religion to proclaim socialism (in contradiction of 
Christian data to the contrary). The follow through reasoning claimed that 
the ASU was socialist because of its demand for social justice among the 
people based on "Sharia" Islamic Law. Arab socialism meant self. 
sufficiency in production and cooperation between the private and pu blic 
sectors. 33 To him religious consciousness and conviction were in no way 
contradictory with engaging in and stressing socialist politics. Most pointed ly 
Quadhafi argued that the Libyan version of the ASU was built on the firm 
basis of Arabism and Islam. 1• There was no justification whatever for 
Libyans (and by inference all other Arab/Islamic peoples) to choose strictly 
between Marxism or capitalist ideologies since Islam could so lve all the 
problems within their society. 35 
The ASU was viewed as a framework for political participation and 
social mobilization. Quadhafi assumed the ASU would substitute for the 
tribal system and bridge the gap between the governmental leadership and 
the masses. As he understood it, the apparatus would facilitate a contro lled, 
popular involvement in a "meaningful manner." 16 But Quadhafi's conce p-
tualization of the ASU went beyond merely creating an institutional struc-
ture. For him, the ASU was the means by which the military revol ution 
could become a truly popular revolution. He was quoted at one point as 
saying "It was the responsibility of the people to take the military revolu-
tion and transform it into a popular revolution which will include all of the 
masses. " 11 If the ASU failed in these various objectives then the revol ution 
might fail and the goal of democratization (to be read consensus) might 
never take place. 
ASU also reflected another aspect of Quadhafi's political concept ualiz-
ing. It was sanctioned as the only legal political organization, all other 
political activities adjudged to be treasonable. The penalty for other ac-
tivities was death. 11 The RCC objected to such devices as poli tical 
parties as potentially divisive forces that would hinder the ultimate unifica-
tion (consensus) and modernization of the country. Quadhafi himself 
argued that their effect was to weaken the country, create confusion, and 
interfere with the people's right to govern themselves. Partisanship was 
repeatedly characterized as "fake parliamentarianism" and "paper con-
stitutionalism." What was needed was a period of political, economic and 
social regimentation in order to achieve the basic conditions for "true 
democracy"-social and economic equality, higher production and a higher 
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standard of living. Only a mas organization like ASU could as ure this. In-
herent here was a contradiction of the democratization purposes of the ASU 
a already indicated. 40 
What realistically occurred was the ASU's legitimization of the RCC 
and Quadhafi's rule in Libya in the name of the people. The ASU became 
e entially a mobilization device for the leadership whenever it needed to 
rallY support. A good example was Quadhafi's effort (ala Nasser) to resign 
the RCC leadership in late I 973, accused the mas es of not being revolu-
tionary enough to achieve the necessary progression he sought. Huge urban 
demonstrations were organized by the ASU to ask Quadhafi to reconsider 
and remain at the leadership helm. No better evidence could be provided 
that the man was the embodiment and symbol of the revolution. It was a 
clas ic calculated test of the leader's popularity and the efficiency of the 
ASU organizational abilities to produce specific results. Of course he stayed on. 
The ASU also failed to become a popular participatory political vehicle 
becau e of it broad member hip. It assumed a need for an imposed 
unanimity on the membership while acknowledging the underlying 
fragmented nature of the tribal society as a causal motivation in creating the 
new uperstructure. Even socio-economic interest sectors could be in 
disagreement, assuming all were really represented, but this was rejected by 
the RCC leadership a partisan and divisive politics. 
Even more damaging to the prospect of the ASU success was its 
paralleling the administrative and political machinery already represented 
by the existing government and RCC leadership. 41 It was all too evident that 
the RCC and Quadhafi had completely coopted and dominated from above 
the ASU committees, preventing them from developing a dynamic quality 
all their own. Urban intellectuals developed a negative preconception of the 
ASU even before it was installed in Libya, secure in the knowledge that its 
counterpart had already failed in Egypt. Ironically, another reason for its 
failure was the general public's inability to comprehend the ASU structure 
and its workings. Furthermore, like all organizational situations, there was 
a lack of coordination between the leadership bureaucracy and the ASU. 
Finally, the real politics of Libya were subsumed under and explained by 
Quadhafi's personal role. Much like his hero, Nasser, virtually every con-
troversy required his intervention, especially where his charismatic image 
was influential with the rural population. 
Popular (Cultural) Revolution 
The ultimate judgment on the failure of the ASU came from Quadhafi 
himself, especially the fulfillment of the goal of transforming itself into a 
popular revolution. •2 Perhaps the telling moment had come before I 973 
with the death of Nasser, his primary inspiration and the lost partner with 
whom Libya expected to integrate (Sadat turned out to be unreceptive). 
However, instead of reading finality to the ASU, Quadhafi let it linger on. 
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Instead he turned his attention to what he considered the underly ing 
substantive conditions that precluded institutional success. In April 1973 he 
proclaimed a "popular and cultural revolution" to be carried out via Peo. 
pie's Committees. lt was intended to shake up the entire traditional tribal 
structure and facilitate "a leap forward" in economic and political deve lop. 
ment. It was clearly an attempt to produce an outburst of revolutionary sen. 
timent tied to Islamic fundamentalism. 4 3 
A five-point reform program was instituted: I) the suspension of ex. 
isting laws and promulgation of new ones; 2) the implementation of Islamic 
thought; 3) distribution of arms to loyal citizens; 4) the purging of poli tical 
deviationists, especially those identified with the communist and capit alist 
alternatives; and 5) a campaign against bureaucratic inefficiency. 44 
According to Quadhafi, traditional institutions and customs rema ined 
as obstacles to rapid rates of development. 45 But the overriding poli tical 
philosophy of popular participation, democratization (consensus-buildi ng), 
also governed this new thrust. The "popular committees" would permi t the 
masses to seize power and would involve them in the running of thei r own 
affairs. Every sector of society would be impacted so that an expande d par-
ticipation would take place and local decision-making would be enha nced. 
Consistent with this concept, the RCC passed Law No. 78 insisting tha t the 
administrative responsibilities of the People's Committees would make 
them instruments of the popular "general will." Municipal governm ents 
were replaced by these Committees, their chairmen taking over the func-
tions of local mayors. 46 The Committee concept was additionally expected 
to unleash new, young and modernizing leaders more responsive to 
Quadhafi's revolutionary perceptions and conceptualizations. •1 
As part of the programatic focus on Islamic thought, Quadhafi made 
the "Third Way" official doctrine. This was the formalization of his belief 
that a new outlook favorable to Islam was necessary, because in his judg-
ment both communism and capitalism had failed. 48 As previously note d, his 
Third Way was based on religion (Islam) and nationalism (Arabism), the 
basic motives in history. 49 
What had the appearances of possible anarchy because of the sanctioned 
activities did not occur. The regime carefully avoided the creatio n of 
"popular committees" in the governmental apparatus. 50 The pop ular 
revolution was intended only for the masses. 
If the new dynamic was intended as a device for instiga ting 
Arab / Islamic integration, particularly with Egypt under Sadat, it failed 
again on this count. The expected merger by September 1973 collapse d as 
Quadhafi's lecturing of Egyptian society about its immorality and corrup-
tion by Islamic standards backfired. Sensing a failure, Quadhafi orde red a 
mass march on Egypt to force Sadat's hand. Sadat reacted firmly by stop-
ping the march and asserting Egypt would not be bullied into a union .51 
The most widely accepted interpretation of this failed transfe rence 
revolves around a politico-military strategy that was being pursue d by 
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Egypt's Sadat. Having made the decision to go to war with Israel, Sadat 
redirected his geo-political orientation away from Libya eastward to an 
alliance with Syria and Saudi Arabia (a regime never overly sympathetic to 
Quadhafi's version of Islam). The defeating blow to Quadhafi's aspirations 
was the Egyptian failure to include, inform or consult him on the decision 
to war against the Israelis. 52 
The Direct Authority of the People (DAOP) 
The "popular revolution" had little prospects for success if the 
people's Committees lacked an overriding formal framework to sustain the 
direction and continuity of change in Libya. On March 2, 1977, the govern-
ment announced its most radical innovation of popular participation and 
mas influence-the Direct Authority of the People (DAOP). This step took 
place after extensive discussion and debates by newly elected delegates from 
around the nation and the military leadership at a meeting in Sabha, the 
largest community in southern Libya. jJ Located away from the traditional 
coastal centers of power and controversy certainly facilitated the decision-
making and the actual decision. 
The political experiment brought with it a renaming of the state, 
hereafter referred to as the "Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,,,,. 
and the introduction of a new institutional pyramid capped by the all-
powerful General People's Congress. 55 The DAOP replaced all previou 
political institutions with the abolition of the RCC and the ASU. As the only 
remaining legitimate political structure, it still made the specific gesture of 
incorporating the "cultural revolution's" People's Committees into the 
new arrangement. Philosophically Quadhafi viewed the newest step as a 
further progression in popular rule and the public's participation in self-
governance. It might well be labelled in western terms "a direct democracy 
y tern," save for the fact that Quadhafi equated democracy with a dic-
tatorial system and envi ioned the continuity of a ensitive revolutionary 
leader (himself) as part of the setup. 56 The clarification of this apparent 
confu ion requires contrasting the republican, representative/legislative 
ystem as the condemned evil democracy and the mass (popular) and direct 
rule system announced as something very different. Quadhafi had contended 
earlier that the era of "republic had gone and the era of mas es must 
prevail." " In a justifying philosophical sense Quadhafi also wrote: 
... any system of government other than popular Congresses is 
undemocratic. All the prevailing systems of government in the world 
today are undemocratic unless they adopt this method . Popular Con-
gresses are the end of the journey of the masses' movement in its quest 
for democracy ... Direct democracy is the ideal method, which, if 
realized in practice, is indisputable and noncontroversial. 51 
As part of the deliberate effort to explain the new political system to 
the people and to justify it, the regime also said: 
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Direct People's Authority shall be the basis of the political systelll 
in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Authority is the 
peoples and none else. The people exercise authority through the Peo. 
pie's Congress, People's Committees, Trade Unions, Professi onal 
Associations, and the General People's Congress. 59 
The total table of organization and chart of responsibility is fou nd in 
the accompanying flow chart (p. 20). The General People's Congress (GPc 
or national Congress) was supposedly the embodiment of the nati onal 
masses integrated at the apex of a pyramid of power. 60 However, an ex. 
ecutive leadership function appeared above the GPC in various for ms. 
There was a General Secretariat for the GPC consisting of five former Rec 
members, a General Secretary (Quadhafi), and the replacement for The 
Council of Ministers (the cabinet) by a General People's Committee, com. 
posed of 26 secretaries (ministers). All of the latter people were civilians ex. 
cept for the Interior post, which was headed by a former police officer . The 
functions of the General People's Committee, as explained by the DAOP, 
was to execute general policy and supervise the People's Committees at the 
municipal level. Theoretically, this institution was responsible to the GPC, 
inferring ultimately the lowest grass-roots agencies called the Basic Pop ular 
Congresses . The selection by the GPC of the initial executive leaders hip 
took place at its first meeting in March 1977. 
Reversing the order of the power pyramid, bottom upward, the public 
entered the institutional process primarily through the Basic Popular Con-
gress (BPC). If decentralization and local governance were to be a truly 
established fact, it was to be exemplified by this unit. The BPC was assigned 
a wide range of activities that elevated them beyond a mere state instrume nt 
for public mobilization and control. 6 ' 
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For purposes of decentralization, the nation was divided into 178 BPC 
territorial units with a population range between 6-30,000 citizens. In turn 
the BPC was subdivided into Mahal/at (administrative zones analogous to 
counties). These units were deliberately designed to cut across fromer tribal 
boundaries, compelling the different tribes to deal with each other, and as 
part of ·the effort to destroy the traditional and regional kinship/loyalty 
networks. Each mahal/a chose two members to represent it in the "political 
committee" of the BPC over a three-year term. The "political committee," 
made up of about 20 uch delegates, was considered the most influential 
and significant of all the functional committees of the BPC. The "political 
committee" operated via a secretary (general type) and vice secretary and 
covered all administrative matters under the BPC's jurisdiction. These mat-
ters included relations with and links between the national Congress and the 
General People's Committee (the ministries). In the national Congress rela-
tionship, the "political committee" was expected to convey constituency 
concerns and opinions. Additionally, the "political committee" was to 
over ee daily political activities (clearly support mobilization and scrutiny 
functions), and to keep a supervisory eye on the People Committees (see 
below). 
A comparable "economic committee" was also constituted to parallel 
the "political committees" of the BPC's. Lacking much in the way of 
members with the necessary technical skills to suggest policies or review 
them, they turned out very insignificant to the workings of the new system. 
The People's Committees were the equivalent of local governments. In 
combination with the "political committee" delegation to the national Con-
gre , they too took on a repre entative function for their region at that 
ame body. 
*pp. 16-17, supra. 
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Size of the delegation in no way reflected influence at the national Cong ress 
as each had only one vote. Because the People's Committees were tanta. 
mount to local government, members, ten in number, serving three- year 
terms, were expected to have technical skills and expertise (based prim arily 
on education) to deal with some very specific problems and needs. Ag ain, 
an executive was to be chosen from among themselves, this person labelled 
a chairman (equivalent to mayor). Because the previous public sector car. 
porations, factories and other institutions had their own govern ance 
system, the People's Committees superseded them and took over their func. 
tions. 62 Thus, the committee system meant a primacy of control and con. 
cern with economic affairs in contrast with the BPC's and their "po litical 
committee" stress. It was assumed that under the new political system these 
People's Committees would become the "change agents" for the Libyan 
revolution, especially reflecting downward the governing power over the 
people and upward the local conditions that varied somewhat from place-
to-place. 
Paralleling this pyramidal structure and yet part of it, was the in-
sistence on interest group participation and representation. 63 Each profes-
sion and occupation was expected to form its own Profe sional Union to ar-
ticulate and defend its interests . This included every employed citizen that 
had to join a union (doctors, lawyer , farmers, students, worker , pro-
fessors, taxi drivers, etc.) except for the military and the police fo rce. 
Unions had informal representation at the national Congress via their 
presidents, but in a non-voting capacity. Other governmental econom ic in-
terest groups (Chambers of Commerce and Industry, etc.) al o partoo k of 
the national Congress activities, serving as official consultants in place of 
their every day role as civil servants. Clearly the union or interest grou p pat-
tern overlapped each other and also the parallel Congress/Committee struc-
ture. They could be represented simultaneously by a voting delegate from 
the BPC and a non voting delegate from the union. Each citize n was 
automatically a member of the BPC in a geographical ense regardle s of 
occupation. Of course at that level of involvement, nothing preclude d the 
individual from expressing and defending their own profes ional inte re ts 
within the BPC. It was assumed this would happen within the context of a 
"useful" con ultative role. 
All of these structures climaxed with the national Congress (GP C) , an 
approximate 1,000-member body empowered to study, debate, make law , 
consider reports on the national budget, and decide question of war, peace, 
and treaties. All programs were expected to now from the deci ions o f the 
national Congress and serve a guidelines for the bureaucracy to 
implement. 64 
Evaluation and Conclusions 
Quadhafi certainly felt he had dispensed with a western- tyle legis lature 
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(even though the national Congres performed exactly like one) and a 
political party ystem. For him, the DAOP pyramidal structure precluded 
the influence or predominance of the society by any single individual, party, 
class or intere t, having been turned into a mass political participation 
organization and proce s. 6 s Safety apparently inhered in number , level of 
organization, and the representation/participation functions of the broad 
citizenry . The outcome seemed to dictate a triumph of "direct democracy," 
or at a minimum, a national infrastructure conducive to such a purpose of 
popular involvement. 66 
Significantly and somewhat defen ively, Quadhafi has maintained that 
the OAOP innovation is in its preliminary stages, really awaiting his subse-
quent perceptions of the emerging Libyan society and its needs. 67 
Quadhafi's belief that he has truly innovated omething entirely new, even 
for the Islamic world, can of course be challenged. Pakistan under Ayub 
Khan in it po t-independence effort at democratizing introduced an 
analogou "panchayat" grass-roots movement, sub equently failing too. 68 
Certainly the view of having overcome imported political institutions 
and ideas reflects both Quadhafi's naivete and some definite slight-of-hand 
techniques. Changing agency names and providing a covering vocabulary 
for this doe n't alter the substantive nature of the actual power pyramid, 
consistently elitist in each of his efforts. 69 A comparison of the ASU and 
DAOP experiment will confirm the gross similaritie despite the use of dif-
ferent language. 
The thru t of this constant innovation seems to indicate that a nation is 
being objected to a political philosophical excursion (and its implementa-
tion) by a young revolutionary hero and his associates who have been 
previously unexposed to the mainstream and range of competitive ideas in 
both the western and eastern worlds of the past. By trial and error they are 
upposedly undergoing a political ophistication, but the progression re-
mains questionable, because the starting place may have been so far back in 
time, that the Libyan revolution has so much to cover as yet. 
There is considerable evidence of Quadhafi's commitment to his 
philosophical conceptualization and the political process of implementa-
tion, whether anticipated in every respect initially or not. ' 0 The fact that he 
has insisted on each stage's implementation, as seen over the course of more 
than the last ten years, in Libyan embassy seizures and takeovers abroad, and 
recently in the DAOP application to the PLO presence in Libya proper, is 
confirmation. '' 
The only possible redeeming view of DAOP may be seen as a transi-
tional stage from military rule to civilian rule, but then strong supporting 
evidences would have to surface that a self-liquidation process is under way 
for the old RCC members and that Quadhafi is prepared to step down. So 
far the entire process of political conceptualization and implementation has 
only seen the shifting of the chairs of power but not the personnel who sit in 
these chairs. Ideological statements and abstractionism are not substitutes 
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for realities of deed and actions. The goal of consensu remains as elusive 
as when Quadhafi first began his que t. 
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